

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07

IO-10 L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01

SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05

BIB-01 ERDE-00 /088 W

----- 104082

P R 100907Z MAR 75

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0886

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO ALL MBFR MISSIONS 0140

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0094

GENEVA FOR CSCE DEL AND DISTO

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: SUMMARY REPORT FOR PERIOD MARCH 3-9, 1975

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: THIS WEEK OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS BROUGHT NO CHANGES OF POSITION. THE WEST REJECTED THE FEB 25 EASTERN MODIFICATIONS TO THE INITIAL REDUCTION STEP PROPOSAL AT THE WEEKLY INFORMAL MEETING. TWO DAYS LATER, THE POLISH REP OFFICIALLY ADVANCED THESE SAME MODIFICATIONS IN HIS PLENARY STATEMENT. AFTER THE PLENARY, THE EAST

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LEAKED THE SUBSTANCE OF ITS MODIFIED INITIAL REDUCTION STEP PRO-

POSAL TO THE WESTERN PRESS. AT WEEK'S END, THE BELGIAN REP SERVED NOTICE TO THE AD HOC GROUP THAT A SERIOUS AHG DISCUSSION WOULD HAVE TO BE HELD DURING THIS ROUND CONCERNING THE FUTURE USES OF INFORMAL MEETINGS. END SUMMARY.

2. IN THE MARCH 4 INFORMAL SESSION OF THE VIENNA TALKS, ALLIED REPS PRESENTED REASONS WHY EASTERN PROPOSALS OF FEB 25 DID NOT REPRESENT A REAL CHANGE IN THE UNACCEPTABLE BASIC EASTERN POSITION. IN ANSWER TO EASTERN CLAIMS THAT THEIR FEB 25 PROPOSALS REPRESENTED IMPORTANT NEW INNOVATIONS, UK REP ROSE PRESENTED THE JOINT ALLIED VIEW THAT THESE MODIFICATIONS REPRESENTED ONLY A SUPERFICIAL REARRANGEMENT OF PROCEDURAL COMPONENTS OF THE EASTERN REDUCTION APPROACH WITHOUT CHANGING ITS BASIC CONTENT, WHICH REMAINED UNACCEPTABLE TO THE WEST.

3. BELGIAN REP ADRIAENSSEN ALSO EXPLAINED THAT, FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF EFFECTS ON THEIR OWN SECURITY, THE ALLIES COULD NOT ACCEPT ANY REDUCTION APPROACH UNLESS IT TOOK APPROPRIATE ACCOUNT OF THE FACT THAT THE TOTAL SIZE OF WESTERN FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS WOULD BE REDUCED AND LIMITED BY AGREEMENTS, BUT THE TOTAL SIZE OF THE FORCES OF THE MAJOR EASTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANT, THE USSR, LOCATED ON THE DIRECTLY ADJACENT TERRITORY, WOULD BE NEITHER REDUCED NOR LIMITED.

4. SOVIET REP KHLESTOV REPLIED THAT THE LATEST EASTERN PROPOSALS SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS A DEPARTURE FROM THE EAST'S BASIC POSITION THAT REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE SYMMETRICAL OR THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS SHOULD ASSUME SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS AT THE OUTSET. KHLESTOV NONETHELESS CLAIMED THAT THE FEB 25 PROPOSALS DID REPRESENT IMPORTANT CHANGES IN THE EASTERN POSITION. KHLESTOV REITERATED THAT THE EAST WOULD NOT BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS DATA UNTIL AFTER RESOLUTION OF SUCH BASIC ISSUES OF PRINCIPLE AS THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET AND WHICH FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED. NOTING PRIOR EAST-WEST AGREEMENT TO FOCUS INFORMAL MEETING DISCUSSIONS ON THE "WHOSE FORCES" ISSUE, KHLESTOV CLAIMED THAT THE  
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ALLIES ORIGINALLY HAD AGREED WITH HIS POSITION.

5. CZECHOSLOVAK ACTING REP MEISNER AGAIN PRESENTED THE PACT CLAIM THAT THE ALLIES WERE DEPARTING FROM SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES AGREED TO IN THE PRELIMINARY TALKS. US REP STRESSED THE NEED TO TAKE GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITIES INTO ACCOUNT IN ANY OBJECTIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTS OF REDUCTIONS ON THE SECURITY OF PARTICIPANTS. HE

CHANNENGED THE EAST TO PRODUCE SPECIFIC DATA AS TO THE REDUCTIONS THEY ENVISAGED IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY THE EASTERN CLAIM THAT THEIR APPROACH ENVISAGED MORE PRECISE OBLIGATIONS THAN THE WESTERN APPROACH.

6. KHESTOV ALSO ATTEMPTED TO SUBSTANTIATE THE EASTERN VIEW THAT GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITIES WERE IRRELEVANT BECAUSE THE AGREED SUBJECT MATTER OF THE TALKS WAS REDUCTION OF FORCES WITHIN THE AGREED AREA IN CENTRAL EUROPE. SOVIET REP CLAIMED THAT, IF SOME GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITIES WERE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, THEN ALL SHOULD BE.

7. IN THE MARCH 6 PLENARY SESSION, POLISH REP STRULAK PRESENTED A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF EASTERN PROPOSALS TO DATE AND THEN OFFICIALLY ADVANCED, ON BEHALF OF THE FOUR WARSAW PACT DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, THE MODIFICATIONS TO THE EASTERN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP PROPOSAL PRESENTED AT THE FEB 25 INFORMAL MEETING. THESE "AMENDMENTS" TO THE NOV 8 DRAFT AGREEMENT WERE PRESENTED IN THE SAME TERMS AS AT THE FEB 25 INFORMAL. STRULAK STATED THAT THE EASTERN FREEZE AND OCT 15, 1974 INITIAL REDUCTION STEP PROPOSALS REMAINED ON THE TABLE, PARALLEL TO THE PROPOSAL JUST PUT FORWARD, THUS PROVIDING THE WEST WITH A RANGE OF CHOICE.

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 EUR-12 H-02 INR-07

IO-10 L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01

SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05

BIB-01 ERDE-00 /088 W

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P R 100907Z MAR 75

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0887

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO ALL MBFR MISSIONS 0141

AMEMBASSY SOFIA  
AMEMBASSY LISBON  
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE  
AMEMBASSY WARSAW  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG  
AMEMBASSY BERLIN  
USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0094

GENEVA FOR CSCE DEL AND DISTO

FROM US REP MBFR

8. THE POLISH REP'S STATEMENT ALSO INCLUDED A POINTED CRITIQUE OF THE ALLIED POSITION. STRULAK TWICE DEFINED THE CENTRAL TASK OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AS THE SUBSTANTIAL MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. STRULAK DEMANDED MUTUALITY AND RECIPROCITY OF OBLIGATIONS, AND CRITICIZED THE ALLIED APPROACH AS AN EFFORT TO CHANGE THE EXISTING CORRELATION OF FORCES AND THUS DECREASE THE PREVAILING DEGREE OF STABILITY. STRULAK CLOSED BY SAYING THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS MUST AGREE TO UNDERTAKE  
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SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS TO REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET.

9. FOLLOWING THE PLENARY SESSION, EASTERN REPS LEAKED THE SUBSTANCE OF THEIR FEB 25 PROPOSALS TO THE WESTERN PRESS. SO FAR, HOWEVER, THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE MEDIA ATTENTION TO THESE PROPOSALS AND THOSE WESTERN PAPERS NOTING THE PROPOSALS HAVE TREATED THEM AS BEING NOTHING NEW.

10. IN THE AD HOC GROUP SESSION OF MARCH 3, BELGIAN REP ADRIAENSSEN RETURNED TO EARLIER BELGIAN COMPLAINTS REGARDING THE USE OF INFORMAL SESSIONS FOR DISCUSSION OF SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. THE AD HOC GROUP DECIDED, AFTER SOME PRELIMINARY DEBATE, ON THE NEED TO DISCUSS THE ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE USE OF THE INFORMAL MEETING MECHANISM BEFORE THE END OF THE CURRENT ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS. AT THE MARCH 7 AHG MEETING ADRIAENSSEN RETURNED TO HIS FEB 13 COMPLAINT REGARDING THE FAIRNESS OF THE SYSTEM FOR CHOOSING ALLIED REPS TO ATTEND INFORMAL SESSIONS. STATING THAT HE SPOKE ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM HIS AUTHORITIES, ADRIAENSSEN INSISTED THAT THE AHG CHAIRMAN ANNOUNCE THE "SCORE" OF HOW MANY INFORMAL SESSIONS EACH ALLIED REP HAD

ATTENDED. ADRIAENSSEN COMPLAINED THAT THE PRESENT PRACTICE  
DOES NOT TREAT ALL ALLIED DIRECT PARTICIPANTS EQUALLY  
BUT FAVORS THE FRG AND UK.

11. DETAILS ON THESE BELGIAN REMARKS ARE IN A  
SEPARATE MESSAGE. WE RECOMMEND THAT ADDRESSEES FOR  
THE MOMENT REFRAIN FROM DISCUSSING THE RENEWED  
DIFFICULTY WITH THE BELGIANS OVER THIS TOPIC WITH  
ALLIED OFFICIALS, PARTICULARLY WITH THE BELGIANS,  
WHILE THERE IS CONTINUED HOPE OF SOME INFORMAL SOLUTION  
AMONG MEMBERS OF THE AD HOC GROUP. RESOR

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## Message Attributes

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